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progressive positions, particularly on the cultural dimen-
sion, than social democratic parties. 
6. Social democrats risk further aggravating these develop-
ments if they take up left-nationalist strategies, that is, 
if they pivot right on the cultural dimension. These policy 
positions deter potential and former voters, who may vote 
for more progressive parties instead. Centrist strategies 
(on both dimensions) could be equally bad for their elec-
toral fortunes as they blur the ideological profile of social 
democratic parties. In the medium term, this leads voters 
to choose parties that have more distinct positions on 
either of the two political dimensions.
7. New left and old left strategies show the highest level 
of support among potential social democratic voters: 
experimental and survey data shows that potential social 
democratic voters prefer old left and new left programmes 
over centrist and left-nationalist strategies. Based on our 
analysis, and given the dilemmas they are facing, combin-
ing aspects of old and new left strategies constitutes 
the most promising avenue forward for social democratic 
parties.
1. Social democratic parties in Western Europe have been 
experiencing an electoral decline of historic proportions 
in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. At 
the same time, radical right parties have been experiencing 
unprecedented electoral success. This has paved the way 
for a common narrative that claims that social democratic 
parties have lost their working-class voters to radical 
right parties either because of their shift to the right on 
the economic dimension (“Third Way”) or because of 
their shift to the left on the cultural dimension (“identity 
politics”). This narrative is wrong in both its assumptions 
and its assertions.
2. The working class in Western Europe in the twenty-first 
century is not a monolithic white male block with au-
thoritarian and nationalist attitudes. A considerable and 
growing share of the working class is female and has a 
migration background. A large share of the working class 
holds progressive positions on questions such as LGBT 
rights and immigration.
3. The radical right is not the new home of former social 
democratic voters. While radical right parties have gained 
proportionally more support from working class voters, 
they should in no way be characterized as the new work-
ers’ parties. Only a small proportion of the Western Euro-
pean working class supports the radical right. In addition, 
only a small proportion of radical right voters used to be 
supporters of social democratic parties. 
4. Social democratic parties have not lost voters mainly to 
radical right parties. Data from various sources and coun-
tries in Western Europe show that only a small minority 
of former social democratic voters have left for radical 
right parties. Social democratic parties have lost voters 
mainly to Green and mainstream right parties. 
5. The loss of the (white) working class is not the driving 
force behind the electoral decline of social democratic 
parties. In fact, social democratic parties have dispropor-
tionately lost voters among the educated middle class. 
The lion’s share of more highly educated voters have left 
social democratic parties for Green and social-liberal 
parties. These parties have been particularly successful 
in attracting this growing class of voters by offering more 
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“Wer die Arbeiter des Rust Belt verliert, dem werden 
die Hipster in Kalifornien auch nicht mehr helfen.”1
Sigmar Gabriel
There can be little doubt that social democratic parties are 
currently facing a fundamental electoral crisis. In the past 
decade, social democratic parties in several Western Europe-
an countries have scored among the worst results in their 
electoral history. It started with PASOK, once near-hegemon-
ic in Greece, which lost nearly three-quarters of its support 
in the May 2012 elections and has been able to survive since 
then only as part of broader electoral coalitions. Consequent-
ly, “Pasokification” has become a term used to refer to the 
broader decline of social democratic parties in European 
countries since the 2010s.
Five years after PASOK, the Dutch PvdA and the French PS 
dropped into single digits in their national elections, losing 
19.1 and 21.9 percentage points, respectively. The same year, 
the German SPD received its worst result in the post-war era 
and has since further declined in the polls. Even the British 
Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, which not long before-
hand had been hailed as the potential future of European 
social democracy, scored its worst result since 1935 in De-
cember 2019.
Looking at the reactions to social democratic parties’ 
electoral decline among commentators and pundits, a com-
mon narrative has emerged to explain the current electoral 
crisis. The basis for this narrative is exemplified in Figure 1, 
which shows the development of vote shares of social demo-
cratic parties and radical right parties in Western Europe since 
1990. While social democratic parties have lost a lot of votes 
in the past 30 years, radical right parties have gained substan-
tial electoral support in the same period and have become an 
established political force across the region. Looking at these 
two developments together, it is not surprising that commen-
tators have made a connection between the decline of social 
democratic support and the rise of the radical right.
1 If you lose workers in the Rust Belt, the hipsters in California won’t be able 
to help you. 
1
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The common narrative about the decline of social democratic 
parties can be summarized as follows: social democratic 
parties have seen a strong decline in their vote share because 
the working class, their former core constituency, has aban-
doned them and has found a new home with the radical right. 
The explanation of why working class voters have abandoned 
social democratic parties usually comes in two different fla-
vours: economic and cultural.  
The first narrative points to the economic and social policy 
changes that happened in the era of Britain’s New Labour 
and die Neue Mitte (New Centre). Pursuing the idea of a Third 
Way, politicians such as Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder 
shifted their parties’ policies to the economic centre. While 
there is an ongoing debate about the policy consequences 
of Third Way policies, many commentators see the electoral 
decline of social democratic parties as a working class back-
lash against the “neoliberal” economic policies of the New 
Labour era.  
A second narrative emphasizes social democratic positions 
on cultural issues such as immigration, European integration, 
gender equality and the environment. Working class voters, 
so the narrative goes, hold decidedly more authoritarian and 
nationalist positions on these issues. As social democratic 
parties are now associated with progressive cultural positions, 
working class voters have rejected them and turned instead 
to radical right parties, which promise tougher policies on 
immigration, less global integration and the protection of 
 so-called “family values”. Both the economic and the cultural 
narrative thus frame the electoral crisis of social democratic 
parties as a response to shifts in their policy positions that 
have alienated working class voters who, in turn, have switched 
their support to the radical right.
These narratives are now so widespread that they have 
become received wisdom in much of the media, politics and 
even some academic work. Every time a social democratic 
party loses an election, a flood of articles, blog and social 
media posts are published that reinforces these narratives. As 
they are brought forward not only by pundits and commen-
tators, but also by (former) politicians, these alleged explana-
tions have had a major impact on the public discourse and 
on the (declining) electoral fortunes of social democratic par-
ties in Western Europe. In addition to advancing their proposed 
narrative of electoral decline, these contributions often, im-
plicitly or explicitly, include a call for action to halt this de-
velopment. 
In interviews with The Guardian (22 November 2018), 
Hillary Clinton, Tony Blair and Matteo Renzi all sounded the 
same note: “Europe must curb immigration to stop right-
wing populism”, in Clinton’s words. According to his former 
head of the European Secretariat, Sir Stephen Wall, Blair 
 already identified immigration as his Achilles heel in 2001, 
allegedly saying “The one thing that could lose me the next 
election is immigration” (Watt and Wintour 2015). This view 
is hardly confined to Clinton and Blair, however. Many US 
 liberals have made similar statements since Trump’s unex-
pected victory. New York Times columnists, from Frank Bruni 
to Thomas Edsall, were at the forefront of this pushback 
from “woke” liberals. In fact, Clinton herself has a long 
track record, in both speech and votes, against illegal immi-
gration and for “border security,” including a “fence” at the 
border with Mexico (Kruzel 2018).  
But many prominent European social democrats have also 
been calling for “immigration realism” since the late 2000s. 
In recent years, for instance, Belgian SP.A chairman John 
Crombez has stated, that “migration to Europe must decrease” 
(Nieuwsblad, 6 January 2019), while former SPD leader Andrea 
Nahles has said that Germany “cannot accept all” asylum 
seekers that arrive at its borders (Der Spiegel, 26 May 2018). 
None has taken it as far as the Danish Social Democrats, 
who are becoming increasingly less distinguishable from the 
far right Danish People’s Party (DF), as they decry alleged 
“parallel societies” of Muslim immigrants in Denmark, and  
argue that immigration “undermines” the Danish welfare 
state (Agustín and Jørgesen 2019).  
Probably, no one has summarized this narrative as well as 
former SPD leader and German Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sigmar Gabriel, who, in an article in Der Spiegel (18 December 
2017) wrote: “If you lose workers in the Rust Belt, the hipsters 
in California won’t be able to help you.”  
This narrative, and the calls for action based on it, has 
also been supported by a number of academics and 
think-tankers, who have offered similar advice: the centre- 
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left has to take care again of the “left behinds” and “some-
wheres” by limiting immigration and departing from an empha- 
sis on post-material policy positions that emphasize gender 
equality, LGBT rights or the environment (Goodhart 2017; Lilla 
2018). Some academics now even go so far as to openly 
defend white identity politics (Kaufmann 2018). Interestingly, 
even though supported by a number of academics, there 
exists very little work by these scholars that is academic and 
provides empirical evidence to support these claims. In fact, 
as we will outline later, most academic work speaks against 
this narrative.
In this report, we investigate the political competition 
 between social democratic parties and radical right parties 
in Western Europe. We empirically investigate the three core 
assertions of the dominant narrative. First, is the radical right 
really the new working class party? Second, have social demo-
cratic parties really lost primarily, or at least disproportion-
ately, working class voters? And, third, have (working class) 
voters really left social democratic parties for radical right 
parties?
We find that the transformation of the Western European 
political space indeed constitutes a dilemma for social demo-
cratic parties. Because their former core constituency contin-
ues to shrink, social democratic parties have been forced to 
appeal to other socio-demographic groups to try to retain 
the same size of the electorate. Building these new alliances  
inevitably comes with trade-offs: appealing to new groups 
necessarily entails the risk of alienating old ones. However, 
these trade-offs do not necessarily play out in the way de-
scribed in the dominant narrative. This is in part because 
the narrative wrongly assumes that the working class is a 
monolith, based on the stereotypical “working class authori-
tarian” white man of the twentieth century (see Lipset 1960).
We demonstrate that the working class today is a socio- 
demographically diverse group and holds a broad range of 
attitudes, not limited to authoritarian and nativist positions. 
While the radical right does appeal to a considerable share 
of the working class, in no way does a majority of the work-
ing class support a radical right party in Western Europe. 
Moreover, with regard to the claimed competition between 
radical right parties and social democratic parties, we show 
that only a small share of today’s radical right voters previ-
ously supported social democratic parties. Similarly, social 
democratic parties have lost relatively few of their voters to 
the radical right. 
In sharp contrast to the dominant narrative, a large share 
of former social democratic voters have gone to more pro-
gressive parties, such as the Greens or social liberal parties. 
We demonstrate that more restrictive positions on immigra-
tion, as well as generally less progressive positions, do not 
help social democratic parties to attract more working class 
and lower educated voters. However, they do alienate a larger 
share of their potential electorate. Our findings show that 
the largest potential for social democratic parties lies in eco-
nomically left-wing and culturally progressive positions. 
Before discussing in detail the three building blocks of 
this narrative of social democratic decline, we shall briefly 
outline (i) the appeal of radical right parties and (ii) the socio- 
structural transformations within European societies that 
form the basis of the social democratic dilemma.
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In order to understand why people support radical right 
parties, it is necessary to distinguish two parts of their appeal. 
On the one hand, these parties appeal to voters through 
their policy positions on issues such as crime, corruption, 
 immigration and multiculturalism. On the other hand, their 
potential to mobilize anti-elite sentiment lends them addi-
tional appeal.
The core ideology of (populist) radical right parties con-
sists of a combination of nativism, authoritarianism and pop-
ulism (Mudde 2007). Nativism combines nationalism and 
xenophobia, which is best captured by the infamous slogan 
“Germany for the Germans: Foreigners Out!”. Nativists strive 
for a monocultural country, in which only “natives” live (or 
have full citizenship) and where everything “alien” (that is, 
non-native), be it ideas or people, is seen as threatening. 
 Authoritarianism is the belief that the state should strictly 
enforce order upon a naturally chaotic population by teach-
ing discipline in schools and imposing severe law and order 
policies. Populism, finally, is an ideology that sees society as 
ultimately divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups, the pure people and the corrupt elite, and that be-
lieves that politics should generally follow the “will of the 
people”.
At its core, radical right ideology is monist and rigid, see-
ing simplistic and “natural” distinctions between people. 
This puts it in direct opposition to the dynamic pluralism of 
liberal democracy. While it has long been argued that the 
radical right is a “normal pathology” of Western democracies – 
that is, a set of values that are fundamentally detached from 
mainstream values and supported by only a small minority 
of the population – it is better seen as a “pathological nor-
malcy”, that is, a radicalization of the mainstream (Mudde 
2010). Many surveys show that large minorities, and some-
times even majorities, support some of the main positions 
of the radical right on issues such as crime, European integra-
tion, immigration and the political establishment. In most 
 European countries, populist radical right parties have so far 
tapped into only an (admittedly growing) part of their poten-
tial electorates.
In the past two decades, the core issues and frames of 
the radical right have become part of mainstream politics in 
many European countries. The most painful expression of 
this process of mainstreaming and normalization is the fram-
ing of immigration as a “threat” to national (and European) 
identity and security, particularly in the wake of the so-called 
“refugee crisis” of 2015–2016 (Mudde 2019). For instance, 
the 2019 manifesto of the mainstream right European People’s 
Party (EPP) discussed immigration under the heading “A Eu-
rope that preserves our way of life”, while the new European 
Commission tried to introduce a “Commissioner for Protect-
ing Our European Way of Life”, who would be responsible for, 
among others, immigration policy.
While the mainstreaming of their issues and frames has 
helped to increase the salience of some of the key issues of 
radical right parties, notably immigration and security, it has 
only partially benefitted these parties electorally. First of all, 
radical right parties now have electoral competition from 
mainstream (right-wing) parties, which at times present light 
versions of their policies and programmes. Second, despite 
a right-wing turn of the political debate, the population is 
turning left on many key issues, in particular on immigration 
and integration. This is largely a generational effect, related 
in part to education (O'Grady 2020). That said, in many Euro-
pean countries radical right parties remain the preferred op-
tion for voters who hold negative attitudes towards diversity, 
European integration, immigration and immigrants, or the 
political establishment. Despite the copy-cat behaviour of 
mainstream parties, they continue to prefer the original over 
the copy, as FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen already noted many 
decades ago. 
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To understand the competition between social democratic 
and radical right parties, as well as the electoral crisis of social 
democratic parties more generally, it is necessary to evaluate 
these developments against the backdrop of the socio-struc-
tural changes of post-industrial societies. Western European 
societies have been – and still are – experiencing distinctive 
transformations of their occupational and social structures 
that have led to a substantial shift in the political space (Be-
ramendi et al. 2015b; Gingrich and Häusermann 2015; Ingle-
hart 1977; Kitschelt 1994). Overall, this transformation has 
been characterized by three major developments. First, edu-
cational expansion, with increasing numbers of people going 
into higher education. This has led to an average increase 
in both educational levels and wealth. Second, a still ongoing 
tertiarization – driven by processes of globalization, automa-
tion and digitalization – has led to a “de-proletarianization” 
of the workforce. Third, family roles and gender norms have 
changed substantially since the end of the Second World War. 
With large numbers of women entering the labour market, a 
progressive feminization of the workforce has been taking 
place (Beramendi et al. 2015a).  
Altogether, this has led to a substantial transformation of 
these countries from industrial into “post-industrial” democ-
racies. While the number of well-educated people working 
in the service sector has increased significantly over recent 
decades, both the relative and the absolute size of the work-
ing class has been shrinking continuously. But the working 
class has changed not only in terms of relative size but also 
in term of socio-structural composition. As a consequence, 
the working class today is significantly more diverse than in 
the 1960s and 1970s (see below).  
These processes have transformed not only the occupa-
tional structure but also the political space in post-industrial 
societies. They have fundamentally changed political values, 
as well as the salience of political dimensions. Among so-called 
“socio-cultural professionals” (Oesch and Rennwald 2018), 
who are often well educated and used to interacting with 
others, as well as open-minded and sensitive to others, ma-
terial concerns are not the most important political issues. 
 Instead, they often focus on post-materialist values, such as 
environmental and feminist issues, which have consequently 
entered the political agenda of all advanced capitalist democ-
racies and continue to gain in relevance (Häusermann and 
Kriesi 2015; Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Therefore, party com-
petition and voter attitudes no longer move along a single 
left–right, economic dimension in these countries in the twen-
ty-first century.  
Several studies have identified at least two dimensions 
that are relevant for the positions of both voters and parties. 
First, the economic dimension (often also labelled “left–right”) 
divides voters and parties into pro-redistributive, state-inter-
ventionist proponents (left), and those preferring the “free” 
allocation of goods and market liberalism (right). Second, a 
cultural dimension (often labelled “liberal–authoritarian”) has 
become an equally salient cleavage in post-industrial societies. 
While the left–right dimension refers mainly to questions 
about economic distribution, the libertarian–authoritarian di-
mension concerns issues related to societal organization. By 
cross-cutting the existing left–right dimension, it has trans-
formed the unidimensional political space into a two-dimen-
sional space (Bornschier 2010; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 
2002; Kitschelt 1994).
The growing importance of the latter political dimension, 
with its “liberal-progressive” and “authoritarian-conservative” 
poles, has also laid the foundation for new political parties 
that have entered the political arena in most West European 
countries. Green or New Left parties offer political pro-
grammes promoting the liberal-progressive pole of this new 
dimension. They have come to attract a big part of the 
growing group of socio-cultural professionals (Oesch and 
Rennwald 2018). Even though there are considerable  national 
differences, social democrats have also adopted many of 
these positions, while simultaneously trying to stick to their 
main issues of economic justice and redistribution. However, 
they are often less outspoken and more ambiguous than 
their “new left” counterparts on these cultural positions (Abou- 
Chadi and Wagner 2019; Kitschelt 1994).  
The success of the radical right can be regarded as the 
mirror image of, and counterreaction to, the ascent of Green 
and New Left parties (Bornschier 2010; Ignazi 1992). As 
 outlined above, radical right parties also prioritize the cultur-
al  dimension over the economic one but seek to occupy its 
4
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 authoritarian-conservative pole instead. In promoting issues 
and positions linked to this pole, such as Euroscepticism and 
opposition to immigration, they have managed to dispropor-
tionally attract voters belonging to the working class and the 
“petit-bourgeoisie” (Oesch 2008; Oesch and Rennwald 2018).
For social democratic parties, the transformed political 
space has created a number of electoral trade-offs. In order 
to remain electorally relevant, they have had to adjust their 
positions to appeal to new groups of voters. The core trade-
off in this changing political environment, then, results from 
the question of how much social democratic parties can ap-
peal to new electoral groups that are more educated, work 
in socio-cultural professions, and live in urban regions, with-
out alienating their former core constituency, the working 
class (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2019; Kitschelt 1994).  
Looking at this trade-off, it seems reasonable to assume 
that radical right parties constitute an attractive alternative 
for social democratic supporters, especially among the work-
ing class. However, it is ultimately an empirical question of 
how much the radical right has attracted working class and 
former social democratic voters. We know that some in the 
working class have always supported parties on the right 
rather than the mainstream left (Lipset 1960). So, it is equally 
plausible that today’s radical right support largely stems 
from this group.  
To understand these dynamics better, it is essential to 
reassess what “working class” means in the twenty-first 
 century.
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Many narratives around the decline of social democratic par-
ties focus on the working class or lower educated voters. 
In both the material and the cultural alienation story workers 
have turned their backs on social democratic parties in re-
sponse to their policy choices. Perceived as the main bene-
factors of this shift, radical right parties are now increasingly 
presented as the new workers’ parties, or as “working class 
parties 2.0” (Arzheimer 2018). These accounts often portray 
the preferences of the working class through a very specific 
lens, that of white, male industrial workers. However, while 
this focus might have been justified in the 1960s, the socio- 
economic transformations of the past half century have 
fundamentally reshaped the working class. In this section, 
we outline what it means to be working class in the twenty- 
first century. What is their socio-demographic profile? And 
what policy preferences do members of the working class 
have?
Although the term “working class” has been used for over 
a century, its meaning has always been contested and its 
structure shifting. There are both objective and subjective in-
terpretations of “working class” and the two do not always 
overlap. Simply stated, a lot of people have “working class 
jobs” but do not self-identify as “working class”, while there 
are also people who self-identify as working class but do not 
have working class jobs. In other words, in life and politics, 
(working) “class” is as much a self-defined identity as it is an 
externally ascribed category of employment.
The common (Marxist) understanding of working class 
has always been relatively narrow and refers mainly to in-
dustrial workers, such as dockers, factory workers and miners. 
The popular image of “the worker” was a white man, which 
has always been at best only partly accurate, as a lot of (white) 
women worked in factories, too (particularly during the wars). 
The so-called Post-Industrial Revolution of the 1960s, which 
shifted the focus of the economy from industry to services, 
did not just change the (absolute and relative) size of the work-
ing class in Western Europe, which halved between 1970 and 
2017, but also profoundly changed its composition (Benedetto, 
Hix, and Mastrorocco 2020; Beramendi et al. 2015a).
In this report, we mainly use data from the European Social 
Survey (ESS), one of the leading social science survey projects 
in Europe, which is often described as the gold standard in 
terms of its sampling and methodology.2 Following a broader 
categorization of eight class groups (Oesch 2006), we define 
the working class in this paper as a combination of both “pro-
duction workers” and “service workers”.3 Simplifying this dis-
tinction only slightly, production workers can be seen as the 
“old working class”, reflecting both the economic model of 
the Industrial Era and the still dominant, if outdated, popular 
representation of the working class. This “old working class” 
is predominantly male and white in most countries but has 
become more diverse in terms of ethnicity and gender since 
the mid-twentieth century. 
In this slightly simplified understanding, service workers 
can be seen as the “new working class”, that is, the workers 
of the Post-Industrial Era. They are the workers of the now 
dominant tertiary sector, active in service industries such as 
customer services, health care and hospitality. Service work-
ers have always been much more diverse than production 
workers, traditionally including a sizeable group of women 
and increasingly also of ethnic minorities.  
Figure 2 demonstrates this diversity of the working class 
in four West European countries.4 It shows how production 
and service workers differ in their composition, based on gen-
der and migration background (being born in a foreign coun-
try or having at least one such parent). First, there is indeed 
a strong gender difference between production and service 
workers. Whereas a majority of production workers are male, 
a majority of service workers are female. Second, it shows 
that a considerable (and growing) share of the working class 
2 For this project, we either use all or the most recent of the 9 waves of the 
ESS, which include the years between 2002 and 2018, and focus specifically 
on Northwestern Europe, a region that has most profoundly experienced the 
socio-economic and political developments that we described in the previous 
section. Our findings are thus based on the following countries: Austria (AT), 
Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), the 
United Kingdom (GB), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), and Sweden (SE).
3 The eight “Oesch-Classes” are as follows: Self-employed professionals, 
small business owners, (associate) managers, socio-cultural (semi-) professionals, 
technical (semi-) professionals, office clerks, production workers, and service 
workers.
4 Using data from the 2018 round of the European Social Survey in four coun-
tries (CH, DE, FRA, NL) 
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has a migration background, topping 25 per cent in both 
categories in all four countries. In Switzerland, a majority of 
both production and service workers have a migration back-
ground. 
The working class also varies strongly in its attitudes. Im-
plicit in the “common narrative” is that the working class is 
a monolithic block supporting authoritarian/nationalist posi-
tions. Interestingly, in his seminal work on working class 
 authoritarianism in the mid-twentieth century, American 
political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset already pointed 
to the diversity of the working class in terms of their prefer-
ences on non-economic issues, including internationalism 
and immigration (Lipset 1959; 1960). But while he noted that 
more conservative or authoritarian positions can be found 
among the working class, he also clarified that the working 
class as a whole is not authoritarian. Additionally, and im-
portant to this paper, Lipset (1959) argued that working class 
authoritarian voters are not much represented within the 
electorates of social democratic parties.
In the following section, we present the political preferences 
of the contemporary working class. We focus on second- 
dimension issues, with regard to which supposedly nativist- 
authoritarian attitudes are a large driver behind the changing 
political allegiances of the working class. We focus on two 
sets of issues that are representative of the main conflicts on 
this dimension, attitudes toward homosexuality and attitudes 
toward immigration (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). All the follow-
ing graphs present the findings for service and production 
workers (in the left panel), as well as attitudes based on a 
respondent’s education (right panel).
Figure 3 shows attitudes of production and service worker 
toward homosexuality. These attitudes concern a typical issue 
on the cultural dimension and correlate strongly with other so-
called “morality issues” as well as attitudes on gender equality. 
We use the item “Gays and lesbians should be free to live the 
way they wish,” which has been used in a multitude of studies 
investigating attitudes toward homosexuality (Abou-Chadi and 
Finnigan 2019).
  Figure 2
Migration background and gender in class groups
Source: Migration background and gender among service workers and production workers (CH, DE, FR, NL; ESS 2018) 
(Reading example: Almost 20 per cent of production workers in Germany are male with a migration background, while over 40 per cent of production 
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We can see that working class respondents hold broadly 
positive attitudes toward the gay and lesbian population. 
More than three-quarters of both production workers and 
service workers (strongly) agree with the statement that 
gays and lesbians should be free to live the way they wish. 
Only a small minority disagree with the statement. Support 
is somewhat higher among service workers, confirming 
longstanding research that this group generally holds more 
progressive positions than production workers (Kitschelt 
and Rehm 2014).  
In the right panel we can see how attitudes toward homo-
sexuality are distributed over educational groups. Unsurpris-
ingly, attitudes are more positive among the more educated. 
However, while we can see that those who strongly agree 
are more represented among those with tertiary education, 
other differences are quite marginal. Most important for this 
study, we see that respondents with lower levels of education 
also hold largely positive attitudes toward the gay and lesbian 
population. In fact, almost 80 per cent (strongly) agree with 
the statement that gays and lesbians should be free to live the 
way they wish.
We now move on to attitudes toward immigration. Im-
migration has not only become a defining issue of the new 
dividing line in the politics of post-industrial societies, but 
attitudes toward immigration also constitute the main deter-
minant of voting for the radical right (Ivarsflaten 2007; Mudde 
2007; Rooduijn 2018). Figure 4 shows how the various groups 
evaluate the statement “A country’s culture is undermined 
or enriched by immigration”, while Figure 5 does the same 
for the statement “Immigration makes the country a worse 
or better place”. Both items are widely used to study atti-
tudes toward immigration and have been demonstrated to 
be strong predictors of radical right voting.
While attitudes toward immigration are less progressive 
than those toward the gay and lesbian population, we see 
far from uniformly authoritarian-nativist attitudes within the 
working class. In fact, over 50 per cent of service workers 
and around 45 per cent of production workers (strongly) agree 
that a country’s culture is enriched by immigration. In both 
cases, the percentage of workers who think that a country’s 
culture is undermined by immigration is (significantly) lower. 
This is slightly different with regard to the question of whether 
immigration makes a country a better or worse place to live 
in, however. More production workers think it makes a coun-
try a worse place, while for service workers views are about 
even. Still, only minorities of both groups think immigration 
makes a country a worse place; roughly 40 per cent of pro-
duction workers and some 35 per cent of service workers. 
In line with decades of social science research, we find 
that attitudes toward immigration strongly correlate with 
education, with people with the highest level of education 
(tertiary) showing the most favourable attitudes towards im-
migration. That said, only a minority of respondents with the 
lowest level of education (Lower Sec) thinks that a country’s 
Figure 3
Gays and lesbians should be free to live the way they wish
Source: Attitudes of educational groups and workers towards homosexuality (pooled data from: Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), the United Kingdom (GB), 
the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), and Sweden (SE); ESS 2002–2018)
(Reading example: Over 30 per cent of production workers strongly agree with the statement that gays and lesbians should be free to live the way 
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Figure 4
Country's culture underminded or enriched by immigration
Figure 5
Immigration makes country a worse or better place
Source: Attitudes of educational groups and workers towards immigration (1) (pooled data from: Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), the United Kingdom (GB), 
the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), and Sweden (SE); ESS 2002–2018)
Source: Attitudes of educational groups and service/production workers towards immigration (2) (pooled data from: Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), 
the United Kingdom (GB), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), and Sweden (SE); ESS 2002–2018)
(Reading example: Around 15 per cent of servie workers strongly agree with the statement that immigration makes a country a better place, while 
around 15 per cent of service workers strongly disagree with the statement
(Reading example: 20 per cent of production workers strongly agree with the statement that the country’s culture is enriched by immigration, 
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culture is undermined by immigration or that immigration 
makes a country a worse place.  
In short, the working class constitutes an increasingly di-
verse and progressive group in the twenty-first century. Al-
though women and people with a migration background are 
more prominent among the “new working class” of service 
workers, where they collectively constitute a majority, a signif-
icant minority of the “old working class” of production work-
ers is neither white nor male. And in terms of attitudes, the 
vast majority of both production and service workers hold 
progressive views on LGBT issues, while a large share holds 
progressive or neutral (and therefore not very strong) attitudes 
on immigration.  
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Former Trump advisor Steve Bannon used to boast that he 
and his (former) boss had turned the Republican Party into a 
“working class party” (The Guardian, 17 December 2019). He 
hereby confirmed a broader narrative that has been increas-
ingly popular since the 1990s, at least in Western Europe, in 
which radical right parties are portrayed as the new repre-
sentatives of the working class. This is in line with academic 
research that showed that, as some radical right parties 
started to gain better results in the 1990s – between 5 and 
15 per cent – their electorates started to develop a slightly 
more distinct profile.  
The few moderately successful radical right parties of the 
early 1980s had attracted both blue-collar and white-collar 
workers, but had been particularly strong among the 
self-employed and small business owners (the so-called “pe-
tite bourgeoisie”). It was the German political scientist Hans-
Georg Betz who first noted a process of “proletarization”, in 
which the more successful populist radical right parties, such 
as the French FN and the Austrian FPÖ, were able to hold on 
to their lower middle class voters, while increasing mainly 
their working class support (Betz 1994). This process of pro-
letarization was followed and strengthened by a shift in the 
propaganda of radical right parties, from instrumental sup-
port for neoliberal policies (such as lower taxes and privati-
zation) to staunch support for welfare chauvinism, that is, so-
cial benefits should go (only) to “our own people” (De Lange 
2007). As a consequence of this programmatic change, the 
more successful radical right parties were able to attract a 
disproportionate number of working class voters (Harteveld 
2016). 
In both academic and popular writings radical right par-
ties became increasingly referred to as “workers’ parties” or 
“a new type of working-class party” (Oesch 2012: 48). The 
stereotypical radical right voter in Western Europe was now 
young(ish), lower educated, male and working class 
(Arzheimer 2018). Moreover, today’s radical right supporters 
are often portrayed as the former support base of social 
democratic parties. However, is this an accurate representa-
tion of the radical right’s electorate? In this section, we first 
document the class basis of the radical right electorate and 
then show where their voters came from.  
Based on the already described class scheme developed 
by Oesch (2006), Figure 6 shows patterns of party support 
for different class groups from the European Social Survey 
of 2002–2018.5 For each class it shows which party re-
ceives the highest level of support. We can see that there 
is some support for radical right parties in all class groups 
but there is also considerable variation. Support for radical 
right parties is lowest among socio-cultural professionals, 
that is, people who work in interpersonal occupations, of-
ten have higher levels of education, but are not managers 
or part of the entrepreneurial elite. The three class groups 
that show the highest level of radical right support are in-
deed the groups already mentioned: small business own-
ers and the old and new working class, that is, production 
and service workers. 
However, it is important to note that while (new and old) 
workers vote somewhat disproportionately for radical right 
parties, these parties should in no way be described as 
”workers’ parties”. Social democratic parties remain the party 
family that receives the highest support among both produc-
tion and service workers. The second largest (and in some 
countries the largest) group among working class voters 
votes for mainstream right parties, such as Christian demo-
cratic and conservative parties. Hence, it is very clear that the 
radical right is in no way the voice of the working class. Their 
increasing success has indeed been based on larger appeals 
to this class but overall, only a small minority of working class 
voters (roughly 15 per cent) has been supporting radical 
right parties in Western Europe in the twenty-first century.
Because radical right parties have seen an increase in 
working class support while social democratic parties have 
lost support, it is not surprising that many commentators 
have regarded these new radical right voters as former so-
cial democratic voters. But how does this pattern look empir-
ically? Where do these new radical right voters come from?
5  Pooled data, that is, we made one dataset from all countries and 
years, to maximize the number of voters.
6
THE WORKING CLASS AND 
THE RADICAL RIGHT
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  Figure 6
Party Choice by Class Group
Source: Party choice by class group (pooled data from: Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), the United Kingdom (GB), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), 
and Sweden (SE); ESS 2002–2018)
Figure 7
Vote Switching to Radical Right Parties since 2000
Source: Vote switching to radical right parties (National Election Studies 2000–2018 from: Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), the United Kingdom (GB), the Netherlands (NL), 
Norway (NO), and Sweden (SE))
(Reading example: Almost 40 per cent of the voters who switched to a radical right party voted for the mainstream right before they switched)
(Reading example: 40 per cent of service workers voted for the mainstream left, while 30 per cent voted for the mainstream right)
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Figure 8
Vote Switching to Radical Right Parties since 2000
Source: Vote switching to radical right parties by educational groups (National Election Studies 2000–2018 from: Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), the United Kingdom (GB), 
the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), and Sweden (SE))
Figure 7 shows the different party families that new voters of 
radical right parties supported in the election before they 
switched to the radical right.6 We can see that the largest 
share of voters that switched to radical right parties in the 
past 20 years previously supported a mainstream right party. 
The second largest group are non-voters. Less than 20 per 
cent of new voters of radical right parties switched from a so-
cial democratic party. Hence, the idea that radical right parties 
largely drew support from disenchanted former social demo-
crats does not find any empirical support. 
It might be of course that voters do not switch to radical 
right parties directly but abandon social democratic parties, 
first for a mainstream right party, or abstain and only later 
switch to a radical right party. This question is much more 
difficult to investigate empirically as it requires long-running 
panel data to track the same people over a longer time peri-
od. Bischof and Kurer (2021) use data from the German So-
cio Economic Panel (SOEP) (as well as panel data in Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom) to achieve exactly that. 
Germany is an ideal case to test this question as AfD sup-
port is a fairly recent phenomenon, so we can track the vot-
ing history of these mostly new voters and see which parties 
they used to support in previous elections. Bischof and Kurer 
(2021) show that only a very small share (less than 20 per 
cent) of 2017 AfD voters previously supported the Social 
Democrats. Thus, even when using panel data to track vot-
ers over time, we do not find any evidence that today’s radi-
6 In order to answer these questions, we rely on two different data 
sources, as well as existing research. Building on Abou-Chadi and Wagner 
(2020b), we use data from national election studies in several countries  
to analyse vote switching from one election to the next. For the period 
2000 to 2018, we can thus document which parties the new voters of 
the radical right supported before they switched
cal right voters are former supporters of social democratic 
parties. 
Moreover, Figure 8 shows that these patterns largely do 
not differ over educational groups. Among voters with low 
levels of education, too, we find that only a small share of 
radical right voters previously supported a social democratic 
party.
So, in sharp opposition to the assertions and assump-
tions of the common narrative, we have shown that the con-
temporary working class (1) is not a monolithic block (of 
white men); (2) does not overwhelmingly hold authoritari-
an-nativist positions; and (3) does not primarily support the 
radical right. In reality, the working class is increasingly di-
verse in terms of gender and ethnicity, holds outright pro-
gressive views on the LGBT community and diverse views on 
immigration (only a minority hold anti-immigration attitudes). 
And while radical right parties do disproportionately draw 
support from working class voters, a large majority of the 
working class supports other parties. In addition, the largest 
share of today’s radical right voters come from mainstream 
right parties or from those who previously did not vote, not 
from social democratic parties.
(Reading example: Less then 20 per cent of voters who switched to the radical right and who have an educational degree below upper-secondary 
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The common narrative assumes that the loss of lower edu-
cated and working class voters to radical right parties lies at 
the heart of the electoral crisis of social democratic parties. We 
have already documented, however, that former supporters 
of social democratic parties constitute only a small part of the 
radical right electorate. In this section we shift the focus and 
look at the electorates of social democratic parties. Specifically, 
we show how social democratic electorates have changed in 
the past twenty years, the period that has seen the most se-
vere decline in electoral support for social democratic parties.
7
HOW HAVE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC 
ELECTORATES CHANGED?
Figure 9
Changes in Social-Democratic Party Support since 2000 by Educational Groups 
The upper graph presents the size of different educational groups in the social democratic electorate and their change in party support. 
The lower graph shows the educational groups as a share of the total group by education. 
Source: Changes in social democratic party support since 2000 by educational groups (National Election Studies 2000–2018 from: Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), 
the United Kingdom (GB), the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), and Sweden (SE))
(Reading example Graph 1: Since 2000, around 30 per cent of social democratic voters have an upper-secondary/vocational educational degree and  
still vote for the social democrats, while around 5 per cent have a tertiary educational degree and have left the social democrats.)
(Reading example Graph 2: Since 2000, 60 per cent of social democratic voters with an upper-secondary/vocational educational degree still vote for 
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Using vote switching data described earlier, we look at which 
socio-demographic groups have stayed with, abandoned 
or joined social democratic parties in the past two decades 
(Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020b). We are again particularly 
interested in the class structure of the voters who have aban-
doned social democratic parties. Unfortunately, the data from 
national election studies that allow us to investigate vote 
switching do not include information on occupation, so we 
rely on education instead.  
Figure 9 presents the same information in two different 
ways. The upper panel shows the size of the different groups 
(stayers, leavers and joiners) in the social democratic electorate 
by level of education. We can see that people with upper 
secondary education and/or vocational training make up the 
biggest share of the social democratic electorate in the twen-
ty-first century, with about similar shares for people with 
below secondary education and tertiary education. First, we 
can observe that in all groups social democratic parties have 
lost (far) more voters than they gained. Second, in absolute 
terms, social democratic parties have lost most voters among 
the middle category in terms of education, not among lower 
educated voters.
The lower panel shows the same groups as a share of 
the total group by education. Irrespective of group size, it 
shows us the groups in which social democratic parties have 
lost the highest share of voters. Again, we can see that pro-
portional losses are quite evenly distributed over all groups. 
Interestingly, and against much of the public narrative, we 
can see that social democratic parties have lost most among 
the highly educated and least among the low educated. Hence, 
we find no support for the idea that the decline of social 
democratic parties is driven primarily by less educated voters. 
On the contrary, social democratic losses are, in absolute and 
relative terms, (much) higher among people with higher levels 
of education.
Another related question concerns which parties social 
democratic parties have lost their voters to. As we have 
shown in the previous section, in sharp contrast to the com-
mon narrative, radical right voters do not come primarily 
from social democratic parties. But this does not necessarily 
mean that social democratic parties do not disproportionally 
lose votes to radical right parties. Figure 10 shows the par-
ties to which social democratic voters have moved.
Several points seem noteworthy. First, social democratic 
parties have lost voters in all directions – no one type of 
transition can be singled out as solely responsible for their 
decline. Second, social democratic parties have lost by far 
the most voters to mainstream right and green/left-libertarian 
parties. Especially in the 2010s, social democratic parties 
lost the largest share of former supporters to more progres-
sive parties (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020b). Third, vote- 
switching to the radical right is responsible for only a very 
small share of the losses of social democratic parties. From 
the people who have left social democratic parties for other 
parties in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, 
only a little more than 10 per cent switched to the radical 
right.
Figure 11 shows that these patterns are roughly the same 
for the different educational groups. As might be expected, 
people with tertiary education primarily left social democratic 
parties for Green and New Left parties. However, even among 
the less educated, switching to the radical right constitutes 
only a small part of the losses of social democratic parties 
(less than 5 per cent).
Figure 10
Vote Switching from Social Democratic Parties since 2000
Source: Vote switching from social democratic parties (National Election Studies 2000–2018 from: Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), the United Kingdom (GB), the Netherlands (NL), 
Norway (NO), and Sweden (SE))
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Source: Vote switching from social democratic parties by educational groups (National Election Studies 2000–2018 from: Austria (AT), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), the United Kingdom (GB), 
the Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), and Sweden (SE))
Figure 11
Vote Switching from Social Democratic Parties by Educational Groups
(Reading example: Since 2000, almost 15 per cent of voters who switched from the social democrats and had an upper-secondary/vocational  
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We have shown that (1) working class preferences should 
not be reduced to authoritarian/nationalist positions; that (2) 
social democratic parties have not disproportionally lost work-
ing-class voters; and that (3) only a small share of former social 
democratic voters have switched to the radical right. We will 
now address the main question that we can derive from the 
common narrative: how do social democratic policy positions 
affect their own electoral support and which ones potentially 
affect voter flows to the radical right? What different strategies 
could social democratic parties pursue and which ones do 
they propose? Following previous research (Abou-Chadi et 
al. 2021), we distinguish four ideal-typical issue profiles for 
social democratic parties: new left, old left, centrist, and left- 
nationalist (see Table 1).
As discussed, one popular narrative on the electoral de-
cline of social democratic parties identifies the supposedly 
progressive-liberal shift from social-democratic parties on the 
liberal-authoritarian dimension as the major reason for their 
electoral decline. In this view, the adaption by social democratic 
parties of progressive positions on “new” topics such as im-
migration and integration, gender equality, and LGBTQ*-rights 
is thought to have alienated the working class (Eatwell and 
Goodwin 2018; Lilla 2017).” While these voters may still be 
attracted to the economic positions of social democratic par-
ties, they prefer to vote for radical right parties because of 
their more authoritarian and nativist stances on the increas-
ingly more salient second dimension. 
Thus, some observers have argued that social democratic 
parties should take up a left-nationalist position. By doing so, 
the argument runs, they would be able to win back their lost 
electoral backbone, the (white) working class, which is be-
lieved now to constitute the electoral core of the radical right. 
The rise of radical right parties is thus seen not only to corre-
late with the social democratic electoral decline, but also as 
a cause of it. Accordingly, social democratic parties have been 
urged to take up less progressive positions regarding immi-
gration or to at least downplay the importance of the cultural 
dimension. This is particularly displayed in a narrative that 
claims that “identity politics” is the main cause of the social 
democratic decline Berman 2016; Berman and Snegovaya 
2019; Lilla 2017, 2018).  
In the mirror-image of the left-nationalist approach, pro-
ponents of a new left strategy argue that social democratic 
parties should take up progressive stances to attract the grow-
ing group of highly-educated voters, as well as parts of the 




Idealtypical Issue Profiles for Social Democratic Parties
Source: Own representation based on Abou-Chadi et al. 2021
New-Left Old-Left Centrist Left-Nationalist
Electoral target group New Middle Class Working Class Middle Class Working Class
Key competitor party Green/Social Liberal Radical Left Mainstream Right Radical Right
Key policy change
More progressive stances 
on the cultural dimension
More leftist stances on 
the economic dimension
More moderate stances 
on both dimensions
More authoritarian stances 
on the cultural dimension
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workers with a migrant background). New left strategies are 
characterized by a combination of “investment-oriented” so-
cial policies (for example, childcare expansion, active labour 
market policies) and progressive positions on issues such as 
gender equality, the environment and immigration. They aim 
primarily to win back/over voters from Green and social lib-
eral parties (Abou-Chadi et al. 2021).
Proponents of the third approach emphasize the electoral 
success of the “Third-Way” politics of the mid-1990s and early 
2000s and call for a “return to the centre”. This centrist ap-
proach proposes moderate positions on both economic and 
cultural dimensions. By pursuing a centrist strategy, social 
democratic parties target the coveted “median voter” and 
aim to attract moderates. They are thus competing mainly 
with the mainstream right for voters of the middle class, who 
are likely to switch between these two parties.
Finally, supporters of an old left strategy argue that this 
shift to the political centre is the main reason for the electoral 
decline of social democratic parties in recent decades (Evans 
and Tilley 2017). While this strategy may have led to electoral 
success in the short term, it has alienated large parts of 
(potential) social democratic voters – particularly belonging 
to the working class – who favour a more leftist economic 
programme. An old left strategy thus proposes to take up 
positions that strongly favour redistribution and consumption- 
oriented policies, such as the expansion of pension and un-
employment benefits, but does not propagate authoritarian- 
nativist stances regarding second dimension policies. Rather, 
the old left strategy argues that the importance of those 
policies should not be emphasized.  
These ideal-typical strategies all come with different trade- 
offs and make different assumptions about which voters the 
electoral appeals of social democratic parties should be direct-
ed towards. It is ultimately an empirical question how these 
strategies play out for the competition between social demo-
cratic and radical right parties and how they specifically affect 
the electoral fortunes of social democratic parties. We have 
already seen that the assumptions underlying some of these 
approaches do not hold up to empirical scrutiny. We have 
demonstrated that while the working class is surely electorally 
relevant for the radical right, social democratic parties have 
not primarily lost voters to the radical right. The bulk of social 
democratic losses over recent decades have gone to other 
parties of the left, such as the Greens, and parties of the main-
stream right. In comparison, voter losses to radical right parties 
have been fairly modest. 
Hence, the left-nationalist narrative overestimates the 
electoral relevance of the working class vote for the electoral 
decline of social democracy and also ignores the socio-struc-
tural diversity of the working class today. Focusing on the 
working class as the core electorate, let alone reducing the 
working class to white men who hold authoritarian-nativist 
positions, bears the risk of tying the electoral success of social 
democratic parties to an ever-decreasing minority of the 
electorate. After all, the working class has significantly de-
creased in size in recent decades and the subset of (white 
male) workers with authoritarian-nativist views have become 
a shrinking minority within that decreasing minority. With 
progressive automation, digitalization and educational up-
grading, there is little reason to assume that this downtrend 
will stop anytime soon. In addition, the left-nationalist strategy 
flies in the face of the positions of the well-educated middle 
class, the fastest-growing class group within West European 
societies.
Our analyses show that social democratic parties have 
not disproportionately lost working class or anti-immigrant 
voters, as the left-nationalist strategy asserts. On the contra-
ry, if anything, educated voters have been overrepresented 
in social democratic losses. Besides that, social democratic 
parties are struggling with an ongoing generational replace-
ment of voters. While their electorates are getting older, they 
have not been able to consistently gain new generations of 
voters. Social democratic vote losses may therefore, to some 
extent, have been caused by and contributed to a progres-
sive “greying of Europe’s social democracy”. 
Less progressive positions, particularly on the cultural di-
mension, are notably unpopular among the youngest genera-
tions (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020a), which are still being 
socialized in terms of political ideologies and partisan identi-
fication. Consequently, social democratic parties risk losing 
newly emerging politicized generations permanently and 
persistently. This is not a new phenomenon, however. In past 
decades, newly emerging generations of potential social 
democratic voters have decided disproportionally to vote for 
leftist competitors instead (notably Green and radical left 
parties). This development could be further aggravated if so-
cial democratic parties started to promote more authoritarian 
stances or downplay issues related to the liberal-authoritarian 
political dimension.
We can, of course, assess more directly and systematically 
how social democratic strategies affect competition with the 
radical right, as well as their own electoral support. Research 
has shown that more anti-immigrant positions among main-
stream parties do not help to reduce the support of the radical 
right (Krause, Cohen, and Abou-Chadi 2021). If anything, 
more anti-immigrant positions lead to higher vote-switching 
to the radical right. More specifically, research finds that 
when mainstream parties become more anti-immigration, 
the level of voter exchanges between mainstream and rad-
ical right parties increases. However, overall, the radical right 
is the net winner of these increased exchanges.
Using original survey data from Germany and Austria,7 
we can also demonstrate that left-nationalist strategies do not 
help social democratic parties to reduce radical right support 
(Abou-Chadi et al. 2021). Figures 12 and 13 show the proba-
bility of choosing a social democratic programme over a 
profile that contains policy positions of the radical right con-
ditional on people’s left–right self-placement. We can see how 
this probability varies between a decidedly left-nationalist 
social democratic profile and a control profile in which differ-
7 For the comparison between two social democratic programs, respond-
ents were asked to rate two programs on a 1 to 7 scale. The programs 
contained information regarding the parties’ stances for nine dif ferent 
policy areas. The respondents were also directly asked to choose which 
program of the two that were shown they preferred. The surveys then also 
contain a survey experiment (“conjoint experiment”), where voters were 
asked to compare random hypothetical programmatic profiles of social 
democratic parties and then to indicate which they preferred. This experi-
ment allows us to evaluate which policy items have a significant negative 
or positive impact on support for social democratic parties’ programmes.
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ent social democratic positions are assigned randomly. While 
the probability of choosing a social democratic over a radical 
right profile declines the more someone self-identifies as 
more right-wing, there is no significant difference between a 
left-nationalist and a random social democratic profile. Put 
differently, more left-nationalist positions do not help to keep 
people from switching to the radical right.
In addition to asking how social democratic party strate-
gies affect the radical right, we can of course also investigate 
how they affect the electoral fortunes of social democratic 
parties themselves. A centrist strategy aims primarily to reach 
voters in the centre, who are not stable social democratic 
voters but have a certain probability of voting for a social 
democratic party. But this strategy risks losing larger parts of 
the already mobilized, effective core electorate to other par-
ties in the left spectrum – especially to Green or radical left 
parties. Research has shown that such a strategy electorally 
harms social democratic parties, especially in the long term 
(Karreth and Polk (2013). Pursuing a centrist strategy may 
help to win elections in the short term, as happened in the 
1990s, but could do more harm in the medium and long term. 
This is because such a strategy, with its rather moderate 
stances, succeeds neither in winning over many centrist voters 
nor in winning new generations and thus younger voters. In 
fact, such a strategy bears the risk of losing left-wing voters 
to leftist competitor parties that offer a more distinct political 
programme on those issues, be they Green, and even social 
liberal, parties on the cultural dimension or radical left on the 
economic one.
Thus, while the “leftist-nationalist” and “centrist” strategies 
seem intuitively appealing, their potential electoral risks are 
very likely to outweigh the potential electoral benefits. Those 
risks may be even higher from a long-term perspective, par-
ticularly when looking at new cohorts of voters, who are cru-
cial for social democratic parties’ electoral future.
Indeed, the data show that left-nationalist programmes 
and centrist programmes are popular across the electorate 
in West European countries, but significantly less popular than 
new left or old left programmes among potentially social 
democratic voters (Abou-Chadi et al. 2021). In fact, potential 
social democratic voters prefer programmes that offer pro-
gressive stances on immigration, gender and environmental 
issues. Furthermore, they also substantially prefer programmes 
that support the expansion of redistribution and social in-
Figure 12
Predicted Probabilities of Choosing a Social Democratic Program  
over a Radical Right Program By Left-Right Self-Placement (Germany)
Source: Predicted probabilities of choosing a social democratic programme over a radical right programme by left–right self-placement (Unique Survey Data, Germany 2020)
(Reading example: German voters who place themselves at 0 on the left–right scale have a probability of 80 per cent of choosing a random or 
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vestment. Hence, proposing less progressive stances on im-
migration and less expansive policies on social investment is 
likely to lead these voters to reject social democratic parties. 
Research shows that there is no trade-off between old left 
and new left strategies within the left-wing electorate, as 
opponents of “identity politics” like to claim, and that social 
democratic parties are most successful when they combine 
social investment policies with more progressive positions on 
the second dimension (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2019, 2020; 
(Abou-Chadi et al. 2021).  
In sum, old left and new left strategies resonate best 
among potential social democratic voters. There is no evidence 
of the often-suggested trade-off between these strategies 
among the potential electorate. In contrast, left-nationalist 
and centrist strategies are not likely to result in electoral gains 
that would outweigh potential losses. Even though these 
strategies may be favoured by some voters, they are not ap-
pealing to those who are most likely to consider voting for 
a social democratic party. Thus, proposing a centrist, let alone 
left-nationalist strategy risks keeping many potential voters 
away and is unlikely to win over sufficient numbers of voters 
to compensate for these potential losses (Abou-Chadi et al. 
2021). In the long term, these strategies look even less prom- 
ising, as less progressive positions among social democratic 
parties are associated with less support among younger 
people (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020a). Hence, taking into 
account that social democratic parties need to build electoral 
coalitions for the future, left-nationalist and centrist strategies 
are most likely to lead to further electoral decline.
Figure 13
Predicted Probabilities of Choosing a Social Democratic Program  
over a Radical Right Program By Left-Right Self-Placement (Austria)
Source: Predicted probabilities of choosing a social democratic programme over a radical right programme by left–right self-placement (Unique Survey Data, Austria 2020)
(Reading example: Austrian voters who place themselves at 0 on the left–right scale have a probability of 90 per cent of choosing a random or 
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The first two decades of the twenty-first century have been 
rough on social democratic parties in Western Europe. What 
first became evident with the implosion of PASOK in Greece 
has turned into an electoral decline of historic proportions 
across Western Europe. At the same time as social democratic 
parties have been losing big, radical right parties have en-
tered a “fourth wave” (Mudde 2019) in which they have been 
achieving unprecedented electoral successes. It is no wonder 
that these two processes have become connected in the po-
litical and public debates. The common narrative has become 
that social democratic parties have lost their working-class 
voters to radical right parties because of either their shift to 
the right on the economic dimension (“Third Way”) or their 
shift to the left on the cultural dimension (“identity politics”). 
Although this narrative has become received wisdom in 
media and politics, including within social democratic circles, 
little empirical evidence has ever been provided to back it up.
In this report, we have put the common narrative to the 
test and found that neither its assumptions nor its claims are 
supported by empirical evidence. First, radical right parties 
are not the alleged “new workers’ parties”, as a (large) major-
ity of workers still support other parties. Second, social demo-
cratic parties have not primarily lost workers. Third, social 
democratic parties have not lost most of their voters to radical 
right parties. In fact, they have mainly lost middle class voters 
to mainstream right (in the 2000s) and to Green parties (in the 
2010s). This should not really come as a surprise, as the, often 
implicit, key assumption is empirically incorrect, too. The 
working class is not monolithic – white, male and with author-
itarian-nativist views. Since the mid-twentieth century, the 
working class has both shrunk and diversified significantly. 
Women and people with a migrant background form an 
ever-growing part of the working class, in particular service 
workers. Moreover, most workers hold progressive views 
on libertarian issues (such as gay rights) and only a minority 
hold anti-immigrant opinions.
These facts have important implications for the various 
suggested strategies for social democratic parties to stave 
off further decline and regain enough ground to lead govern-
ment coalitions. The left-nationalist strategy, in which social 
democratic parties pivot right on the cultural dimension (pri-
marily on immigration) to compete with radical right parties, 
will attract only a small group of the (lost) electorate. At the 
same time, it will push away a much larger electorate, includ-
ing the young and the fast-growing group of higher educated 
professionals. Similarly, a centrist strategy, in which social 
democratic parties take more centrist positions on both the 
economic and the cultural dimension, will probably attract 
few people and keep away the same groups. Both the old left 
strategy, in which social democratic parties pivot left on the 
economic dimension, and the new left strategy, in which they 
pivot left on the cultural dimension, are the most promising. 
In both cases the gains significantly outweigh the losses. More- 
over, the two are not mutually exclusive, as is often assumed 
and asserted. Economically left-wing voters prefer culturally 
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With an ever declining and greying electorate, it is clear that 
social democratic parties will have to make fundamental 
changes to remain relevant in the twenty-first century. But 
these changes should be guided by solid empirical evidence 
and grounded in genuine social democratic ideology. Many 
social democrats have bought into the common narrative 
and have called for either a playing down of “identity politics” 
or even for pivoting right on cultural issues such as immigration 
and integration. Leaving aside that this has further strength-
ened the mainstreaming and normalization of the radical right 
(Mudde 2019), it has not halted the electoral decline of social 
democratic parties or the electoral rise of radical right parties.
We end this paper by discussing four points that we be-
lieve should guide discussions about how to help make social 
democratic parties important political actors in the twenty- 
first century. They deal with the role of the social democratic 
party, the rejuvenation of its electorate, the continued need for 
“identity politics”, and the building of a new electoral coalition.
1. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES ARE NOT 
THE PARTY OF THE WHITE WORKING CLASS  
Social democracy in the twenty-first century cannot under-
stand itself as providing the party of the white working class 
alone. Electorally, a strategy based on appealing mainly to 
white working and lower middle class people will eventually 
mean reducing social democracy to a party with a niche ap-
peal and an increasingly old (and dying) electorate. We cannot 
emphasize enough how much social structures have changed 
in the knowledge economy. The share of people employed in 
routine tasks has declined dramatically in the past three dec-
ades, while the share of people working in non-routine cog-
nitive tasks stands at around 50 per cent in most Western 
European countries (Häusermann et al. 2021). In Germany, for 
example, the share of the cohort attending university lies at 




If social democratic parties want to stay electorally relevant, 
they also need to appeal to young, educated, female and 
non-white voters. These voters are not the “urban elite”. The 
“average voter” today is not, say, a miner or a factory worker, 
but rather a customer service representative, graphic designer 
or project manager. 
Normatively, social democracy in the twenty-first century 
needs to go beyond the mere representation of the white 
working class, too. By today’s standards, the factory worker 
of at least the mid-20th century had a privileged position, a 
well-protected and well-rewarded permanent position. In a 
world of globalization, and within the knowledge economy, 
many of these classic working-class positions have disappeared, 
or they are being replaced by precarious positions that pay 
less and/or lack protection and security. It is one of the great 
challenges of contemporary social democracy to find a way 
to integrate this socio-demographically diverse “precariat” and 
new working class into a broader movement for economic 
and social justice in the twenty-first century.  
2. REJUVENATING THE ELECTORATE
The electoral dynamics analysed in this report are important 
not only with regard to past voters, but also in relation to 
future voting behaviour. Emerging cohorts of voters are more 
in favour of progressive positions and are likely persistently 
to prefer parties that offer a clear and progressive profile in 
this dimension. Pursuing left-nationalist or centrist strategies 
may thus harm social democratic parties, not only in the short 
term, but also – and particularly – in the long-term. With al-
ready aging electorates, social democratic parties are destined 
for electoral insignificance if they do not find a way to reju-
venate their electorates.   
This generational decline should be a warning sign for 
social democratic parties. In many European countries, social 
democratic parties have little appeal among younger gener-
ations, who rather support social liberal or Green parties in-
stead. Without attracting new voters and appealing to young-
er generations other parties will soon become the leading 
force of the Left – such developments are already visible in 
10
TOWARD A SOCIAL DEMOCRACY FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
28FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – Division for Analysis, Planning and Consulting
France, Germany and the Netherlands, for example. Hence, 
party strategy needs to go beyond the next election and ask 
how a long-term, durable progressive coalition can be (re-) 
attached to social democratic parties. This strategy puts so-
cial democratic parties primarily in competition with Green 
and social liberal parties, which should at the same time be 
their most likely coalition partners. The best way to stand 
out from these two competitors is to combine the shared 
progressive cultural policies with more unique, bold and in-
novative left-wing economic policies.
3. THE CONTINUED NEED FOR 
‘IDENTITY POLITICS’
The future of social democratic parties in Western Europe 
(and North America) is increasingly discussed under the label 
of “identity politics”. In its original meaning, identity politics 
is of course at the heart of the history of social democracy, 
the labour movement, and the struggle for democratic rep-
resentation. Originally coined by the Combahee River Collective 
(1977), the idea of identity politics signifies that oppressed 
groups are themselves best equipped to signify and repre-
sent their own preferences. Even a cursory look at the history 
of social democratic and socialist party formation should 
make it obvious that this thought lies at the heart of the demo-
cratic class struggle and social democracy itself.
In the current debate, the meaning of identity politics has 
become more diffuse, however. Identity politics has become 
an umbrella term for political and social demands to address 
structural discrimination based on race, gender or sexual 
identity. A core idea is that structures are maintained and re-
produced through performative acts, such as speech. The 
ways we talk and act affect perceptions of social categories 
and create boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Political 
demands often labelled “identity politics” focus on making 
these mechanisms of structural discrimination visible and 
counteracting them by changing the way we speak and act, 
but also by overhauling some social and political institutions 
altogether. 
In the debates most relevant for social democracy, oppo-
nents argue that identity politics (1) are the agenda of an 
urban educated elite and (2) divide the redistributive coalition. 
As this report has shown, these claims are largely based on 
a misperception of who the working class is and what it 
wants, as well as on a wrong idea of who the redistributive 
coalition and the support groups of social democracy are. 
Large shares of the new middle-class groups that support 
left-wing parties are very much in favour of redistribution 
(sometimes even more than the working class) (Abou-Chadi 
and Hix 2021). Moreover, we have shown that, contrary to 
the assertions of opponents, many policies associated with 
identity politics are supported by the overwhelming majority 
of working class and lower educated voters, while only a 
minority of these groups truly oppose them (even immigra-
tion).
Rather than seeing “identity politics” as in competition 
with “class” politics, they should be considered intrinsically 
intertwined. As long as the institutional structures of heter-
onormativity, patriarchy and white supremacy remain intact, 
the material advancement of marginalized groups will not 
make them equal citizens. At the same time, the destruction 
of these institutional structures alone will not change the 
economic, and therefore political, marginalization of these 
groups. Moreover, the material advancement of marginalized 
groups will make them into a more powerful (or less power-
less) force against these institutional structures. 
For the bulk of potential voters of social democratic parties, 
there is no trade-off between more progressive positions on 
the cultural and the economic dimension. In fact, we find 
support for more outspoken progressive positions on both 
dimensions. In other words, a strategy of redistributive eco-
nomic policies and new “identity politics” is most likely to 
attract the largest share of potential social democratic voters, 
including those from the working class. If social democratic 
parties do not want to give up a broad class appeal, this com-
bination of positions seems to be the only viable strategy for 
the long run.
4. BUILDING A NEW PROGRESSIVE 
COALITION
Social democratic parties should not just build a new electoral 
coalition, but also a new progressive political coalition. This 
includes finding new ways of engaging and incorporating 
membership, as well as strengthening ties with civil society 
actors. We have already documented how the electorate of 
social democratic parties has become significantly older. This 
is even more the case for their members. Members play a 
key role not only in mobilizing during campaigns but also in 
generating links between political parties and different 
groups in society. If social democratic parties want to be more 
than technocratic policy providers, attracting young and di-
verse members is essential. 
Social democratic parties in many countries also need to 
re-cultivate their relationship with trade unions. Labor unions 
themselves have of course suffered from many of the same 
developments outlined in this report and have struggled to 
represent a growing precariat. But a revival of this relation-
ship should be in the interest of social democratic parties and 
trade unions themselves. “Work” and “labour” will remain at 
the core of social democratic ideas and policy positions. The 
coming decades will fundamentally challenge what the con-
cept of work means, how wage labour is structured and what 
types of tasks will still be done by humans. Social democratic 
parties are best placed to actively shape these transformations 
and prevent them from exacerbating social and economic 
inequalities. Focusing on the future of work is also a way for 
social democratic parties to distinguish themselves from 
Green and social liberal competitors. This project can work 
only in alliance with labour unions. 
At the same time, social democratic parties need to re-
think and redevelop their relationship to social movements. 
Failing to incorporate the new social movements of the 1970s 
and 1980s is one of the main reasons for the electoral dilem-
ma that social democratic parties are facing today. If social 
democratic parties repeat these mistakes with progressive 
movements such as Fridays For Future or Black Lives Matter 
they will lose further generations of potential supporters.
29LEFT BEHIND BY THE WORKING CLASS?
In general, parties of the Left need to redevelop their relations 
with each other. The German case is the prime example: 
the refusal of the SPD and the Left Party to cooperate has 
resulted in coalitions with the SPD as the junior coalition 
partner of the mainstream right Union parties. These types 
of coalitions make it impossible for social democratic parties 
to make the necessary changes for a strategy for the coming 
decades. The often affectively driven animosities between 
different groups on the Left will prevent coalitions that are 
able to implement profound and durable progressive change. 
Other countries, such as Portugal, demonstrate the potential 
of cooperation between different parties on the Left.  
With some exceptions, the time of big parties in advanced 
capitalist democracies is over and party systems are more 
fragmented than ever before. As society has become more 
diverse and less structured, electoral politics has become 
two- or even three-dimensional. As a consequence, voters 
have become more dispersed and volatile, and most party 
systems now have at best one party able to attract more than 
one-third of the vote. Even if social democratic parties re- 
establish their position as one of the biggest parties, they 
will still require the support of one and more likely two (or 
even more) other parties to be able to create coalitions that 
will enable them to implement some of their key policies. 
Hence, they need the cooperation of other progressive parties, 
from radical left to social liberal, and the support of progres-
sive civil society organizations such as trade unions. It is there-
fore essential that these parties and progressive organiza-
tions stop seeing each other as potential threats to their 
power but rather as potential allies in their political struggle.
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